{"id":4286,"date":"2026-11-14T10:57:38","date_gmt":"2026-11-14T18:57:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/qubole-aws-cross-account-roles-railway-antifox-cloud-trust\/"},"modified":"2026-11-14T10:57:38","modified_gmt":"2026-11-14T18:57:38","slug":"qubole-aws-cross-account-roles-railway-antifox-cloud-trust","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/qubole-aws-cross-account-roles-railway-antifox-cloud-trust\/","title":{"rendered":"Quand l'identit\u00e9 du fournisseur est celle de l'attaquant\u00a0: les r\u00f4les AWS de Qubole, Build Escape de Railway et AntiFox"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>From the <a href=\"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/the-keys-were-already-inside-mag212-cyber-weekly-november-14-2026\/\">MAG212 CYBER Weekly, 14 November 2026<\/a>. Status labels: confirmed by vendor, reported by researchers, or unverified. Every command below is copied from official documentation and was <strong>not tested by MAG212<\/strong>; run it only on systems you are authorised to administer.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"m2-status wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Status:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Qubole:<\/strong> <strong>reported by researchers<\/strong> (Wiz, Sentra, Mandiant) via BleepingComputer and CSO <sup><a href=\"#src-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href=\"#src-41\">[41]<\/a><\/sup>. AWS says its services were &#8220;not compromised\u2026 operated as designed&#8221; <sup><a href=\"#src-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup>. BleepingComputer found no Qubole statement. MAG212 did not fetch the primary Wiz and Sentra blogs <sup><a href=\"#src-42\">[42]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href=\"#src-43\">[43]<\/a><\/sup>.<\/li>\n\n<li><strong>Railway:<\/strong> based on Railway&#8217;s incident report as reported by BleepingComputer (10 Nov); the report itself was not fetched <sup><a href=\"#src-44\">[44]<\/a><\/sup>.<\/li>\n\n<li><strong>AntiFox:<\/strong> single secondary source (BleepingComputer, citing Arctic Wolf) <sup><a href=\"#src-45\">[45]<\/a><\/sup>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What happened \u2014 Qubole<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Why this matters<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cross-account roles are designed to let vendors in. When the vendor&#x27;s own account is compromised, the External ID check passes and the activity looks legitimate. Dormant integrations nobody remembers are the gap, so inventory and revocation beat detection alone. <em>(MAG212 analysis)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><a href=\"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/qubole-aws-cross-account-roles-railway-antifox-cloud-trust-diagram.png\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/qubole-aws-cross-account-roles-railway-antifox-cloud-trust-diagram.png\" alt=\"Qubole&#x27;s compromised AWS account assuming dormant integration roles in several customer accounts with valid External IDs to read secrets and S3 data, beside a smaller Railway panel showing a build-container escape leading to decrypted environment variables.\"\/><\/a><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Diagram: MAG212 CYBER. Solid red = observed or vendor-confirmed; dashed amber = reported or unverified; green = recommended control.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From <strong>14 to 26 October<\/strong>, an attacker used IAM credentials from Qubole&#8217;s AWS account (<strong>805246085872<\/strong>) to call STS <code>AssumeRole<\/code> into customers&#8217; Qubole integration roles. Every request carried the <strong>correct External ID<\/strong>. Many of the roles were dormant, or left over after the customer had stopped using Qubole <sup><a href=\"#src-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup>. The timeline <sup><a href=\"#src-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>14 Oct:<\/strong> first attempts, from a Mullvad VPN address.<\/li>\n\n<li><strong>18 Oct:<\/strong> a second Qubole IAM identity comes into use.<\/li>\n\n<li><strong>14\u201326 Oct:<\/strong> most of the activity comes from an OVH VPS at <code>57.129.54[.]120<\/code>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Inside customer accounts, the attacker <sup><a href=\"#src-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href=\"#src-41\">[41]<\/a><\/sup>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>enumerated resources<\/li>\n\n<li>read Secrets Manager, SSM Parameter Store and Lambda environment variables<\/li>\n\n<li>downloaded S3 data, sometimes whole buckets<\/li>\n\n<li>validated the harvested AWS keys, Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials with TruffleHog<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sentra counted more than 100 passwords and keys taken in about 7 minutes, and reports no write operations. Dozens of organisations were affected <sup><a href=\"#src-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What happened \u2014 Railway<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In its new 10 November incident report, Railway said that on 20 October an unknown flaw in its build infrastructure let attackers escape filesystem isolation. From there <sup><a href=\"#src-44\">[44]<\/a><\/sup>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>They obtained an internal credential.<\/li>\n\n<li>That gave access to build histories and source code.<\/li>\n\n<li>A misconfigured trust relationship then gave them credentials able to <strong>decrypt customer environment variables<\/strong>.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The attackers were removed on 21 October <sup><a href=\"#src-44\">[44]<\/a><\/sup>. The impact <sup><a href=\"#src-44\">[44]<\/a><\/sup>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>up to about <strong>100,000 workspaces (1.85%)<\/strong> potentially affected; Railway gives this as a maximum, not a confirmed count<\/li>\n\n<li><strong>1,852 users&#8217;<\/strong> linked-account tokens exposed and reset, including GitHub OAuth tokens and AI agent keys<\/li>\n\n<li>about <strong>$740,000<\/strong> in fraudulent AI usage, with the attackers using AI agents<\/li>\n\n<li>the activity is linked to the Wiz-described <strong>&#8220;Black October&#8221;<\/strong> campaign against AI developer platforms<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What happened \u2014 AntiFox<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Arctic Wolf reported attackers using <strong>AntiFox<\/strong>, an open-source agentic pentest platform forked from ARTEX and self-hosted on Alibaba Cloud. Three intrusions were described <sup><a href=\"#src-45\">[45]<\/a><\/sup>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>An IIS webshell harvested connection strings, then probed AWS.<\/li>\n\n<li>Hundreds of API calls in about 30 minutes cycled through identities. Some succeeded and exposed production secrets.<\/li>\n\n<li>Attackers read, copied and deleted S3 data.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The report does <strong>not<\/strong> say which steps the AI agents performed <sup><a href=\"#src-45\">[45]<\/a><\/sup>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Who is affected<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Qubole:<\/strong> any AWS account that ever created a Qubole cross-account role and did not delete it <sup><a href=\"#src-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup>.<\/li>\n\n<li><strong>Railway:<\/strong> workspaces notified by Railway, and the 1,852 users whose tokens were reset <sup><a href=\"#src-44\">[44]<\/a><\/sup>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>How the Qubole attack works:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The vendor&#8217;s IAM identity is compromised. <em>How is unknown.<\/em><\/li>\n\n<li>The attacker calls <code>sts:AssumeRole<\/code> into the customer role with a valid External ID.<\/li>\n\n<li>They read secrets stores and S3.<\/li>\n\n<li>They validate the stolen secrets offline.<\/li>\n\n<li><em>Unknown:<\/em> any use of the harvested Entra and Okta secrets afterwards.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What defenders should look for<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Qubole IOCs:<\/strong><ul><li>IAM user ID <code>AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS<\/code><\/li><li>source IP <code>57.129.54[.]120<\/code><\/li><li><code>sso_agent.iso<\/code> on attacker infrastructure (TCP 23458; deployment not confirmed)<\/li><\/ul><\/li>\n\n<li><strong>CloudTrail events to review from 1 October<\/strong> (named by Wiz): <code>AssumeRole<\/code>, <code>ListBuckets<\/code>, <code>ListObjects<\/code>, <code>HeadObject<\/code>, <code>GetObject<\/code> <sup><a href=\"#src-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup>.<\/li>\n\n<li><strong>AntiFox:<\/strong> successful calls hidden inside bursts of <code>AccessDenied<\/code> <sup><a href=\"#src-45\">[45]<\/a><\/sup>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>False positives:<\/strong> legitimate Qubole jobs, if you still use the service. Compare against job schedules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">How to investigate<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Filter CloudTrail for <code>AssumeRole<\/code> events where the caller&#8217;s account is 805246085872. Then follow each assumed-role session&#8217;s activity. Inventory every secret readable by that role and treat it as exposed. <em>AWS CLI and CloudTrail query syntax was not verified this week, so MAG212 prints no commands.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Contain and remediate (in order)<\/strong> <sup><a href=\"#src-40\">[40]<\/a><\/sup><sup><a href=\"#src-45\">[45]<\/a><\/sup>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Revoke the role&#8217;s active sessions.<\/li>\n\n<li>Rotate every secret the role could read, including the Entra service-principal secrets and Okta OAuth client secrets stored in AWS.<\/li>\n\n<li>Delete unused vendor integrations.<\/li>\n\n<li>Narrow trust policies to specific vendor principals, and add source-IP or VPC-endpoint conditions.<\/li>\n\n<li>Require IMDSv2 and enable GuardDuty.<\/li>\n\n<li><strong>Railway users:<\/strong> rotate every environment variable stored on the platform, and re-link the GitHub and AI-provider tokens.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Verify recovery<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Confirm no cross-account roles trust departed vendors. Confirm old secrets fail. Check for unexpected Entra or Okta sign-ins by the rotated clients.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Prevention and awareness<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">An External ID protects against the confused-deputy problem, <strong>not<\/strong> against a compromised vendor. Treat every vendor role as standing access: review it quarterly and delete it the day the contract ends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>No command panels.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Related on MAG212 CYBER<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/the-keys-were-already-inside-mag212-cyber-weekly-november-14-2026\/\">MAG212 CYBER Weekly, 14 November 2026: The keys were already inside<\/a> (full issue and PDF)<\/li>\n\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/subscribe-free\/\">Subscribe free to MAG212 CYBER<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Sources<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><span id=\"src-40\">[40]<\/span> BleepingComputer, &#8220;Hackers exploit trusted AWS access to breach multiple cloud environments&#8221;, 10 Nov 2026 (AWS statement added 11 Nov). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bleepingcomputer.com\/news\/security\/hackers-exploit-trusted-aws-access-to-breach-multiple-cloud-environments\/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">link<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><span id=\"src-41\">[41]<\/span> CSO Online, &#8220;Qubole supply chain attack exposed AWS, Entra ID and Okta credentials&#8221;, 10 Nov 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csoonline.com\/article\/4246780\/qubole-supply-chain-attack-exposed-aws-entra-id-and-okta-credentials.html\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">link<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><span id=\"src-42\">[42]<\/span> Wiz, &#8220;Qubole cross-account access abused in the wild (not fetched)&#8221;, Nov 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/wiz.io\/blog\/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">link<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><span id=\"src-43\">[43]<\/span> Sentra, &#8220;Inside the Qubole supply chain attack (not fetched)&#8221;, Nov 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/sentra.io\/blog\/breaches\/inside-the-qubole-supply-chain-attack\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">link<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><span id=\"src-44\">[44]<\/span> BleepingComputer, &#8220;Railway breach leads to $740,000 in fraudulent AI charges&#8221;, 10 Nov 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/bleepingcomputer.com\/news\/apple\/railway-breach-leads-to-740-000-in-fraudulent-ai-charges\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">link<\/a><\/li>\n\n<li><span id=\"src-45\">[45]<\/span> BleepingComputer, &#8220;Hackers use AntiFox AI agents in AWS credential theft attacks&#8221;, 11 Nov 2026. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bleepingcomputer.com\/news\/security\/hackers-use-antifox-ai-agents-in-aws-credential-theft-attacks\/\" rel=\"noopener\" target=\"_blank\">link<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Written and edited by El Mostafa Ouchen for MAG212 CYBER. Facts checked against the sources above as of 14 November 2026, 10:05 AM PST. Diagrams are original MAG212 CYBER illustrations.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Un compte fournisseur compromis a usurp\u00e9 des r\u00f4les inter-comptes inactifs avec des identifiants externes valides pour acc\u00e9der aux donn\u00e9es confidentielles des clients. Comment le d\u00e9tecter dans CloudTrail et bloquer l'acc\u00e8s fournisseur permanent\u00a0?<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4264,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[13,15],"tags":[193,281,373,374,250],"class_list":["post-4286","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-cyber-incidents","category-threat-intelligence","tag-aws","tag-cloud-security","tag-qubole","tag-railway","tag-third-party-risk"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4286","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4286"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4286\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4264"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4286"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4286"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cyber.mag212.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4286"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}