

EIGHT BRIEFINGS · FACT-CHECKED 29 OCTOBER 2026

The edge, the cloud & the code

Firewalls, SD-WAN controllers, hypervisors and build pipelines: the systems that hold trust together were the targets this week. What is confirmed, what is assessed — and what to check today.

LEAD STORY · ACTIVELY EXPLOITED

Cisco ASA and FTD: one VPN request can reload the firewall

CVE-2026-76418 · no login needed · fixed releases on page 3

8.6
CVSS · HIGH

TODAY'S STATUS BOARD

EVIDENCE · SEVERITY

03	Cisco ASA / FTD VPN reload — CVE-2026-76418	EXPLOITED	HIGH 8.6
04	SD-WAN implant built to collect keys — KeyDrift	ASSESSED	CRIT 10.0
05	Silent Train: Volt Typhoon's relay network — Lumen	REPORTED	RESEARCH
06	VMware ESX logging gap, now in CISA KEV — CVE-2026-41709	EXPLOITED	LOW 2.7
07	Alpine's GitLab: app patched, Ruby wasn't — CVE-2026-97229	ATTEMPTED	CRIT 10.0
08	So-net: 2.58 million customer records — cause unknown	CONFIRMED	BREACH
09	iRhythm: patient data via social engineering — ~8.18M	CONFIRMED	BREACH
10	GitHub package firewall for npm — public preview	CONFIRMED	DEFENCE

Every claim graded: **CONFIRMED** **REPORTED** **ATTEMPTED** **UNVERIFIED**

Primary sources checked 29 Oct 2026 · AI illustrations labelled

READ FIRST

What needs attention today

Ordered by urgency, not by headline count. Patch actively exploited edge devices first; investigate anything that holds keys or administrator authority; then close the data-exposure and supply-chain gaps.

STORY	STATUS	SEVERITY	DO THIS TODAY
03 Cisco ASA/FTD SSL VPN reload · CVE-2026-76418	EXPLOITED	HIGH 8.6	Check for secondary authentication on any tunnel group; upgrade to the fixed release
04 Cisco SD-WAN KeyDrift implant · CVE-2026-20127	ASSESSED	CRIT 10.0	Confirm controllers are on fixed releases; hunt for the listed artifacts
05 Silent Train Volt Typhoon relay network	REPORTED	RESEARCH	Inventory internet-facing management platforms and who can reach them
06 VMware ESX insufficient logging · CVE-2026-41709	EXPLOITED	LOW 2.7	Patch the right branch; confirm logs reach a protected collector
07 Alpine GitLab Ruby left unpatched · CVE-2026-97229	ATTEMPTED	CRIT 10.0	Check the Ruby inside every GitLab image you run, not just the GitLab version
08 So-net 2.58M customer records exposed	CONFIRMED	BREACH	Affected users: expect convincing phishing; follow So-net's reset notice
09 iRhythm patient data taken via social engineering	CONFIRMED	BREACH	Patients: consider a fraud alert or credit freeze; review insurance statements
10 GitHub package firewall for npm	CONFIRMED	DEFENCE	Enterprise Cloud teams: pilot it on one CI workflow

HOW TO READ THIS EDITION

CONFIRMED / EXPLOITED

Stated by the vendor, CISA or the affected organisation.

REPORTED / ASSESSED

Named researchers' findings or assessments, not yet confirmed by the vendor or victim.

ATTEMPTED

Exploitation attempts observed; success not shown.

UNVERIFIED

Circulating without a primary source. We say so, or leave it out.

Severity badges follow the CVSS bands: Low 0.1–3.9, Medium 4.0–6.9, High 7.0–8.9, Critical 9.0–10.0. Severity is not priority: an exploited 2.7 can matter more than an unexploited 9.8.

EDITOR'S NOTE

The common thread this week is **trust infrastructure**: a VPN gateway, a fabric controller, a hypervisor's audit log, a build server's runtime and a package registry. When the component that everything else trusts fails, patching is necessary but not sufficient — you also have to establish what it saw, what it signed and who could reach it.

Incident dates and reporting dates are given separately for every story. Where the cause is unknown, we say so. Recommendations marked as editorial guidance are ours, not the vendor's.


El Mostafa Ouchen · Founder & Editor · 29 October 2026

01 · NETWORK EDGE · ACTIVELY EXPLOITED

Cisco ASA and FTD: one VPN request can reload the firewall

An unauthenticated flaw in how the SSL VPN handles secondary authentication is being exploited. It takes remote access down; it does not, on the evidence published, expose data.

CVE-2026-76418 **HIGH 8.6** Advisory published **28 Oct 2026, 19:15 GMT** CISA KEV: **not listed** in the 28 Oct catalog release



What happened

Cisco says its PSIRT "became aware of active exploitation" in October 2026. A crafted request sent while connecting to the SSL remote-access VPN makes an ASA or FTD device reload, because of logic errors when **secondary authentication** is configured on a tunnel group. The impact is availability only.

A device is exposed only if all three are true: it runs an affected release, the SSL VPN login is reachable, and secondary authentication is set on a tunnel group — **including DefaultWEBVPNGroup and groups hidden from the login page.**

Cisco has published no attribution, scale or indicators, and no public proof-of-concept had been reported by 29 Oct. This is the second exploited ASA/FTD SSL VPN denial-of-service flaw since August (CVE-2026-20349, added to KEV on 11 Aug). Credit: Eric Fernald, found while resolving a Cisco TAC case.

FIRST FIXED RELEASES

ASA TRAIN	FIXED	FTD TRAIN	FIXED
9.16 and earlier	9.16.4.104	7.0 and earlier	7.0.11
9.18	9.18.4.96	7.2	7.2.13
9.20	9.20.4.50	7.4	7.4.9
9.22	9.22.3.200	7.6	7.6.7
9.23	9.23.1.48	7.7	7.7.14
9.24	9.24.1.27 / 9.24.10.1	10.0 / 10.1	10.0.3 / 10.1.1

Sources: [1] Cisco advisory [cisco-sa-asaftd-tunnel-dos-s6mgkb75](#)

What to do

- **Find exposure:** list every tunnel group with a secondary authentication server group, and every interface where WebVPN is enabled.
- **Upgrade** to the fixed release after HA and failover checks. Save crash information and timestamps first.
- **Interim only:** Cisco lists `no tunnel-group-list enable`, or removing secondary authentication from `DefaultWEBVPNGroup`. Cisco warns the second option "lowers the remote access VPN security posture". Neither is a fix.
- **Detect:** alert on unexpected reloads and new crash files, correlated with VPN connection attempts.

READ-ONLY CHECKS (ASA CLI)

```
# Running release
show version | include Version
# Tunnel groups using secondary authentication
show running-config tunnel-group | include tunnel-group|secondary-authentication
# Interfaces with WebVPN enabled, login group list
show running-config webvpn
# Evidence of recent unexpected reloads
show crashinfo
```


ENGINEER TIP

Secondary authentication is usually your MFA leg — and having it configured is what makes the device vulnerable. MFA does not protect against this pre-login crash; only the upgrade does.

Cisco SD-WAN: an implant built to collect encryption keys

Talos has dissected KeyDrift, malware an advanced group planted on Catalyst SD-WAN controllers compromised through a flaw disclosed in February. It was designed to harvest IPsec key material; Talos does not report that keys were taken.

Talos report **28 Oct 2026** ("historical" activity, no dates given) Entry: **CVE-2026-20127** **CRIT 10.0** KEV and CISA ED 26-03 since **25 Feb 2026**
Actor: **UAT-11473**



What Talos found

After entering through the controller authentication bypass, **rsshd** uses `ptrace` to inject **PolyFlame** (`libdssl.so`) into the legitimate **vdaemon** process, giving a TinyShell-like backdoor and relay functions. **LittleFilch** (`libcommon.so`) hooks `SSL_read` to parse decrypted control messages: transport IP, the peer's OMP system-IP and a 32-byte field Talos assesses as AES-256 IPsec key material.

Talos calls UAT-11473 "highly sophisticated" and lists its targets as space and satellite services, defence and aerospace technology, and policy research. It assesses with high confidence that the group's infrastructure **overlaps with Volt Typhoon's Silent Train** network (next page) — an infrastructure overlap, not proof of a single actor.

Not new: CVE-2026-20127 was disclosed on 25 Feb 2026 (reported by Australia's ACSC), added to KEV that day and covered by CISA Emergency Directive 26-03. Talos tracked earlier exploitation (UAT-8616) to at least 2023.

Hunt and recover

ARTIFACTS TO LOOK FOR

<code>/etc/sv/sshd/</code> · <code>/etc/sv/aaamgr/</code>	Modified runit service paths
<code>conf_sshd</code> · <code>rsshd</code>	Injector and its config
<code>libdssl.so</code> · <code>libcommon.so</code>	PolyFlame · LittleFilch
<code>/var/tmp/vdaemon.bin</code> · <code>vdaemon.conf</code> · <code>/tmp/system-vdaemon</code>	Staging files (.conf deleted after reading)
<code>/rootfs.rw</code> remounted <code>exec</code> · <code>aaamgrd</code>	Persistence; packed PolyFlame variant that tampers with PAM

Snort: SIDs 65938 and 65958 (the CVE); 67387–67416 (Snort 2) and 7:44–7:73 (Snort 3) for the implant. Treat artifacts as leads; compare with known-good controllers.

Fixed releases: 20.9.8.2 · 20.12.5.3 or 20.12.6.1 · 20.15.4.2 · 20.18.2.1; releases before 20.9 must migrate. Talos advises patching, Cisco's hardening guide, monitoring and a TAC case if compromise is found. Where root compromise is found, CISA's ED 26-03 requires a rebuild — Cisco warns an implant can survive an upgrade.


ENGINEER TIP · EDITORIAL GUIDANCE

If a controller was compromised, plan key and certificate rollover with Cisco TAC so you don't partition the fabric. Key collection does not prove every session was decrypted — but assume control-plane secrets are burned.

Silent Train: Volt Typhoon's disposable relay network

Lumen's Black Lotus Labs maps how Volt Typhoon chains compromised home routers, IoT and enterprise devices — rebuilt in under two minutes — to reach management platforms through at least four zero-days.

Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 28 Oct 2026 Activity tracked Nov 2023 – Jul 2026 Indicators published: none Analyst: Michael Horka



What Lumen found

Silent Train is the name Black Lotus Labs gives to Volt Typhoon's operational framework: ephemeral chains of compromised devices that hide where administration traffic really comes from. Lumen reports **at least four confirmed zero-days and one likely one**, all in platforms that manage other systems.

PLATFORM	VULNERABILITY
N-able N-central	CVE-2025-8875 · CVE-2025-8876
Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN	CVE-2026-20127 (page 4)
VeloCloud Orchestrator	CVE-2026-16812
Versa Director	Zero-day (per Lumen)
Quest KACE	"Likely" zero-day, moderate confidence

Targets named by Lumen: universities, government, telecoms, defence contractors, satellite communications, MSPs and IT firms, and critical infrastructure including water, energy and transportation. Lumen's own figures differ on session length (about 4 hours in the text, 8–10 hours in a caption), and it dates the SD-WAN exploitation from late 2025 while Talos traced related activity to 2023 — possibly different clusters.

Why it matters for defenders

OUR ANALYSIS When each relay is a residential router used once, static IP blocklists and geo-blocking catch little: by the time an address is shared, it has already been discarded. Lumen does not publish indicators, and does not make the blocklist point itself.

REDUCE THE OPPORTUNITY · EDITORIAL GUIDANCE

- Inventory every internet-reachable management platform (RMM, SD-WAN, orchestrators, hypervisor managers) and its owner.
- Put management access behind controlled entry points with phishing-resistant MFA; allow-list administrator sources rather than block-listing attackers.
- Treat MSP and partner access paths as part of your attack surface.
- Correlate identity, configuration-change and flow logs; flag admin sessions from residential ranges or new geographies.

ENGINEER TIP

An IP block can end one connection but cannot restore a compromised control plane. Keep evidence outside the systems an administrator-level attacker can alter.

Sources: [4] Lumen Black Lotus Labs: Silent Train · [2] Cisco Talos: Inside KeyDrift (UAT-11473)

04 · VIRTUALISATION · KNOWN EXPLOITED

VMware ESX: a 2.7 that CISA now lists as exploited

A logging flaw lets a malicious administrator perform certain operations without an audit record. The score is low; CISA's decision to add it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 28 October is not.

CVE-2026-41709 · CWE-778 **LOW 2.7** AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N Broadcom **VMSA-2026-0006** (29 Jul; rev. .2 19 Aug)
CISA KEV: **added 28 Oct 2026**

**PRIOR ACCESS**

Attacker already holds ESX administrator rights

REQUIRED**CERTAIN OPERATIONS**

Specific admin actions on an affected ESX host

CONFIRMED**NO AUDIT EVENT**

The host never generates the expected log

CONFIRMED**BLIND RESPONDERS**

Investigation misses what happened

What is established

Broadcom rates the ESX insufficient-logging flaw CVSS 2.7: an attacker with administrative privileges can perform "certain operations" without them being logged. It is a post-compromise anti-forensics problem, not a way in. Broadcom lists no workaround.

CISA added the CVE to KEV on 28 October 2026. The flaw was reported by Ian Barton of CrowdStrike. **REPORTED** CrowdStrike links its use to the China-nexus group **WARP PANDA**; we could not find that link in CrowdStrike's public WARP PANDA profile, so treat the attribution as unconfirmed.

SAME ADVISORY, BIGGER BUGS

VMSA-2026-0006 also fixes two vCenter flaws rated CVSS 9.8 and the ESX VMXNET3 flaw CVE-2026-47876 (9.3). On ESX 8.0, build U3j fixes the logging flaw but **not** CVE-2026-47876 — that needs ESXi80U3k-25595708 or ESXi80U2f-25626445.

Patch accurately

PRODUCT	FIXED BUILD FOR CVE-2026-41709
ESX 9.1.x	ESXi-9.1.0.0-25370933
ESX 9.0.x	ESXi-9.0.2.0100-25595025
ESX 8.0	ESXi80U3j-25429389
ESX 7.0	Via Broadcom Support (extended contract)
VCF 5.x	5.2.4
Telco Cloud Platform	KB449886

INVESTIGATE THE BLIND SPOT · EDITORIAL GUIDANCE

- Correlate vCenter events, admin authentication, management-network flows and remote syslog — a missing local event does not prove nothing happened.
- Check named admin accounts, shell/SSH enablement, scheduled tasks and configuration drift.
- Forward ESX logs to a collector administrators cannot alter, and alert on ingestion gaps.

```
# ESX shell: build and remote syslog target
vmware -vL
esxcli system syslog config get
```

ENGINEER TIP

Prioritise by exploitation, privilege and asset value as well as CVSS. If an administrator account was stolen, patching the logging flaw is only one step of recovery.


Sources: [5] Broadcom VMSA-2026-0006 · [6] CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog · [7] CrowdStrike: 2026 threat landscape report

05 · DEPENDENCIES · ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION

Alpine's GitLab: the app was patched, Ruby wasn't

Alpine Linux upgraded its GitLab after a critical CI flaw — but its custom image used standard Ruby, which lacked the regex-engine fix GitLab ships only in its official packages. Attackers tried twice.

CVE-2026-97229 **CRIT 10.0** (fixed by GitLab 12 Oct) Attempts **20–21 and 25–26 Oct** Alpine disclosure **28 Oct 2026**



What happened

CVE-2026-97229 allows unauthenticated code execution through a crafted regular expression in CI/CD configuration. During the first attacks on 20–21 October, Alpine says its instance was mistakenly still on GitLab 19.3.4, which lacked the fix. It upgraded to 19.3.6 on 22 October — but its image used upstream Ruby, so the Ruby regexp patch that GitLab applies inside its official packages never arrived. The attacker returned on 25–26 October.

Upstream Ruby shipped fixes on 23 October (3.3.13, 3.4.12, 4.0.9). Alpine republished `alpinelinux/gitlab:19.3.6` on 27 October with Ruby 3.3.13 and finished rebuilding on 28 October, resetting passwords and replacing secret keys.

CONFIRMED No package or release tampering was found, and signing keys were never stored on GitLab.

NOT EXCLUDED Alpine found no evidence of code execution but cannot rule it out because some logs are missing.

Related: GitLab's 21 Oct release for CVE-2026-110264 (another CVSS 10 regex flaw; 19.5.1, 19.4.3, 19.3.6 and older branches) also ships its fix as a Ruby patch inside official packaging — the same trap applies to any custom-built image.

What to do

- **Alpine image users:** pull `alpinelinux/gitlab:19.3.6` again and confirm the digest is from 27 Oct or later — earlier pulls and older tags are vulnerable.
- **Alpine's own ruby package** is fixed: 3.4.12 on 3.22, 3.23, 3.24 and edge; 3.3.13 on 3.21 (`apk upgrade`).
- **Reused passwords:** users of `gitlab.alpinelinux.org` should change it anywhere else it was used.
- **Everyone running GitLab:** verify the runtime inside the running container, not the tag; rotate CI secrets and runner tokens after any suspected compromise.

```
# Official Omnibus image: GitLab version is what counts
gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info | grep -E 'GitLab|Ruby'
# Custom / source builds: compare with 3.3.13 / 3.4.12 / 4.0.9
ruby --version
# Alpine hosts
apk list --installed | grep '^ruby'
```

In official packages GitLab patches Ruby in place, so the Ruby version string alone may not show the fix — check the GitLab release instead.

ENGINEER TIP

Crashes alone don't prove a breach, and no crashes don't prove safety. Establish what your retained logs can and cannot show before declaring recovery.


Sources: [8] Alpine Linux: GitLab security incident (CVE-2026-97229) · [9] GitLab 19.5.1 patch release (CVE-2026-110264)

06 · CUSTOMER DATA · JAPAN

So-net: 2.58 million customer records exposed

Unauthorised access on 19 October exposed So-net and plala member data and 54,401 email passwords. Login passwords were not leaked. How the attacker got in is still under investigation.

Sony Network Communications Access **19 Oct** Detected **23 Oct** Scope confirmed **24 Oct** Announced **27 Oct 2026**



Confirmed scope

RECORDS	COUNT
So-net member records	2,141,986
plala S-course records (operated for NTT Docomo)	443,495
Email passwords (G mail, A-Box, So-net VAIO mail, PostPet mail) — reset 27 Oct	54,401
Bank-account records (account number and holder name; no PINs)	16
Password-reset notification records	7

Member fields include name, gender, date of birth, phone number, email address and IDs. So-net says member **login passwords were not leaked**, and no secondary harm had been confirmed as of 27 October. We found no threat-actor claim.

The cause remains under investigation, so we do not label this SQL injection, stolen credentials or an unpatched CVE. NTT Docomo published its own notice for plala customers; So-net reportedly notified Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission. Support line (Japan): 0120-36-8887.

For affected customers

- Follow the instructions in So-net's official notice, reached by typing the address yourself — not from links in messages.
- Expect phishing that quotes your real name, phone number or member ID. Verify any call or message using a number you already have.
- Change the password anywhere you reused your affected mail password; review mail forwarding and recovery settings.
- The 16 bank-account holders should watch statements and alert their bank.

For operators · editorial guidance

- Alert on bulk reads and exports from customer databases.
- Store service secrets (mail passwords) separately from profile data, hashed where possible.
- Delete personal data you no longer need — it cannot leak if it isn't there.

ENGINEER TIP

Blocking the source IP is containment, not a root-cause fix. Confirm the entry path and the attacker's reach before declaring recovery.


Sources: [10] So-net official notice, 27 Oct 2026 (Japanese) · [11] INTERNET Watch: So-net incident report (Japanese)

07 · HEALTHCARE · PATIENT DATA

iRhythm: patient data taken from business apps

Attackers used social engineering to download patient data from third-party-hosted business applications in June. Notification letters began on 2 October; public breach filings put the total at about 8.18 million people.

iRhythm Holdings (Zio heart monitors) Access **3–8 Jun 2026** SEC 8-K **10 Jun** Notices from **2 Oct 2026**



What is confirmed

iRhythm's 10 June SEC filing says the affected data "was obtained through social engineering". The specific technique and application have not been disclosed. On 9 June a threat actor demanded payment not to publish the data; iRhythm has not said whether it paid, and no group has claimed the attack.

Exposed data includes patient names, contact details, dates of birth, account and device identifiers (including device serial numbers), insurance information and dates of service. The company says there was no impact on its devices or clinical systems and it has no evidence of identity theft.

SCALE

Oregon DOJ breach list	8,179,772
Texas	298,647
South Carolina	69,526

SecurityWeek reported the 8.2 million figure from a regulatory filing; it was not on the HHS breach portal as of 19 October. iRhythm has not published a total. Proposed class actions are consolidated as *In re iRhythm Holdings Data Breach Litigation*, No. 3:26-cv-06070 (N.D. Cal.).

Sources: [12] iRhythm Holdings SEC Form 8-K, 10 Jun 2026 · [13] iRhythm update, 2 Oct 2026 · [15] The Record: iRhythm breach reports · [14] SecurityWeek: iRhythm breach toll (secondary)

For patients

- Read your notification letter; the company's call line is 1-844-770-7175.
- Consider a fraud alert or credit freeze and check your free credit reports, as the company advises. No credit monitoring is offered in the public release.
- Review insurance statements (EOBs) for services you didn't receive — medical identity theft is the main risk.
- Be wary of calls or emails that quote your device or account details.

For providers and vendors · editorial guidance

- Social engineering of help desks and SaaS admins is the entry point to defend: require call-back verification and phishing-resistant MFA for account recovery.
- Inventory third-party app sessions, API tokens and export rights; alert on bulk patient-data downloads.

ENGINEER TIP


A vendor's application is still inside your data boundary. Ask whether your logs can show who exported which records, through which app, and when.

08 · SUPPLY CHAIN · DEFENCE

GitHub package firewall: a policy gate before npm install

A new GitHub Enterprise Cloud preview checks npm packages against your policy before they reach developers, CI runners and coding agents — including a default block on newly added install scripts.

Public preview **20 Oct 2026** **GitHub Enterprise Cloud** (incl. data residency) **npm only** Free in preview · metered at GA (no date)



What it does

The firewall sits between endpoints or internal registries and upstream npm, and evaluates each install against enterprise policy.

CONTROL	DEFAULT
Cooldown (minimum package age)	1 day (0–365)
Vulnerability advisories	Blocks Critical
Malware advisories	Available
Attestation-downgrade checks	Available
Newly introduced install scripts	Blocked by default

Clients are pointed at the firewall with `.npmrc` or `npm config set` plus a GitHub token. Artifactory integration is experimental. GitHub itself warns that remotes reaching public npm directly can bypass the policy.

Sources: [16] [GitHub changelog: package firewall public preview](#)

Deploy deliberately · editorial guidance

- Pilot on one representative CI workflow; test a blocked package and the exception process.
- Close bypasses: block direct egress to `registry.npmjs.org` from runners, and check scoped registries.
- Keep lockfiles reviewed, use short-lived build credentials and keep production secrets out of install steps.

```
# Shows the registry, scoped (@scope:registry)
# and per-project overrides in one place
npm config list
```

ENGINEER TIP
A cooldown cuts exposure to brand-new malicious releases, but advisories can lag new malware. Also limit what install-time code can reach.

OPERATIONS · NEXT 24 HOURS

Turn today's reporting into evidence

A playbook for the products in this edition. Adapt it to what you actually run, and record what you checked, not just what you patched.

0-2 H · INVENTORY

- Owners and exact versions for ASA/FTD, SD-WAN controllers, ESX, GitLab images and npm build paths
- Which management interfaces are reachable, and from where
- Exploited first: ASA/FTD, ESX (KEV), SD-WAN (KEV since Feb)

2-8 H · PRESERVE & CONTAIN

- Export crash files and logs to protected storage before changes
- Restrict management paths; apply approved emergency patches with failover plans
- If compromise is plausible: preserve, then rebuild from trusted software with vendor support

8-24 H · VERIFY & CLOSE

- Confirm running builds — including the Ruby inside GitLab images
- Verify log ingestion; rotate exposed secrets
- Assign owners for evidence gaps; write recovery criteria

READ-ONLY CHECKS BY PRODUCT

PRODUCT	COMMAND	WHAT IT TELLS YOU
Cisco ASA	<code>show running-config tunnel-group include tunnel-group secondary-authentication</code>	Whether any tunnel group meets the vulnerable condition
Cisco ASA	<code>show crashinfo</code>	Recent unexpected reloads to correlate with VPN logs
Cisco SD-WAN	<code>show version</code>	Controller release vs 20.9.8.2 / 20.12.5.3 / 20.15.4.2 / 20.18.2.1
VMware ESX	<code>vmware -vl · esxcli system syslog config get</code>	Build number and where host logs are sent
GitLab (Omnibus)	<code>gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info</code>	GitLab and Ruby versions as the application sees them
Alpine	<code>apk list --installed grep '^ruby'</code>	Ruby package version on Alpine hosts
npm	<code>npm config list</code>	Effective registry, including scoped overrides

CLOSURE EVIDENCE

Affected asset list · fixed running build · reviewed access paths · retained logs · secret rollover scope · functional recovery checks. Patching alone does not make a previously compromised system trustworthy.

USE WITH CARE

These are read-only examples, not validated output. Run them only on systems you administer, in the right context (host vs container). Command syntax varies by release — check your vendor documentation.

EDITORIAL INTEGRITY

Fact-check log & sources

Every story was checked against primary advisories, filings and named research on 29 October 2026. These are the changes verification made to our earlier draft.

WHAT VERIFICATION CHANGED

DRAFT SAID	VERIFIED
iRhythm: entry method not established	SEC 8-K: obtained through social engineering
iRhythm: HHS listing of 8,179,772	Figure is on the Oregon DOJ list; not on the HHS portal as of 19 Oct
iRhythm: "new impact reporting 29 Oct"	Counts published 9–20 Oct; no 29 Oct update found
So-net: "notice updated 29 Oct"	Notice dated 27 Oct; no later update found
VMware: CrowdStrike reports WARP PANDA zero-day use	Labelled Reported; not in CrowdStrike's public profile. CISA KEV added 28 Oct
"SD-WAN key theft"	Talos assesses key collection; exfiltration not reported
SD-WAN presented as new	CVE-2026-20127 disclosed, KEV-listed and under ED 26-03 since 25 Feb 2026
Silent Train and KeyDrift as separate stories	Talos links their infrastructure; cross-referenced
"Rotating relays defeat static blocklists"	Labelled as our analysis; Lumen does not say this
Alpine: attempts 20–21 Oct	Also 25–26 Oct; first attacks hit 19.3.4

OPEN ITEMS — VERIFY ON THE DAY YOU ACT

- Whether CISA adds CVE-2026-76418 (Cisco ASA/FTD) to KEV after 28 Oct
- Which GitLab 19.3 release first fixed CVE-2026-97229 (sources say 19.3.4 or 19.3.5)
- iRhythm's own total of affected people

PRIMARY SOURCES

[1]	Cisco advisory cisco-sa-asafld-tunnel-dos-s6mgkb75
[2]	Cisco Talos: Inside KeyDrift (UAT-11473)
[3]	Cisco advisory cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk (CVE-2026-20127)
[4]	Lumen Black Lotus Labs: Silent Train
[5]	Broadcom VMSA-2026-0006
[6]	CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
[7]	CrowdStrike: 2026 threat landscape report
[8]	Alpine Linux: GitLab security incident (CVE-2026-97229)
[9]	GitLab 19.5.1 patch release (CVE-2026-110264)
[0]	So-net official notice, 27 Oct 2026 (Japanese)
[1]	INTERNET Watch: So-net incident report (Japanese)
[1]	iRhythm Holdings SEC Form 8-K, 10 Jun 2026
[3]	iRhythm update, 2 Oct 2026
[4]	SecurityWeek: iRhythm breach toll (secondary)
[5]	The Record: iRhythm breach reports
[6]	GitHub changelog: package firewall public preview
[7]	BleepingComputer: Cisco SD-WAN zero-day since 2023 (Feb 2026)

EDITORIAL STANDARDS

Defensive explanations only: no exploit code, no malware execution, no device or tenant accessed for this issue. Incident and reporting dates are stated separately. Unknown causes stay unknown. Recommendations marked "editorial guidance" are MAG212 CYBER's, not the vendor's or the victim's.

COLOPHON

Who made this edition, and how

Transparency is part of the reporting: who publishes MAG212 CYBER, how this edition was produced, and how to reach us.

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Evidence cut-off	29 October 2026. Advisories, KEV listings and fixed versions change: verify with the vendor before acting.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Story banners are AI-generated conceptual illustrations, labelled on the image. They are not photographs, screenshots or forensic reconstructions, and they do not depict the affected organisations' systems. Diagrams and the cover are original MAG212 CYBER typography.

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