Incident Response Cheat Sheet: The First 60 Minutes
Incident response: the first 60 minutes
You think you have been breached. What you do in the next hour decides how much evidence survives, how far the attacker gets and how much it costs. Print this, fill in your contacts, and keep it somewhere you can reach when your normal systems cannot be trusted.
Five rules before you touch anything
Minute by minute
Confirm and declare an incident
- Confirm the signal is real: alert, ransom note, unusual logins, user report.
- Declare an incident and name one incident lead who makes decisions.
- Start the incident log (time in UTC, observation, action, by whom).
- Photograph screens that show ransom notes or error messages.
Find out what is affected
- Which systems, accounts and data are involved? Which business services are down?
- Is it still spreading? Check for new encrypted files, new admin accounts, unusual outbound traffic.
- Identify the likely entry point: phishing email, exposed VPN or remote desktop, unpatched server, stolen password.
- Check vendor advisories and CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list for anything internet-facing you run.
Stop the spread, keep the evidence
- Isolate affected machines from the network (unplug or EDR isolation). Leave them powered on.
- Disable compromised accounts and revoke their active sessions and tokens.
- Reset privileged passwords from a known-clean device, starting with domain and cloud admins.
- Block known bad IPs, domains and file hashes at the firewall, mail gateway and EDR.
- Collect volatile evidence before changing more: running processes, network connections, logged-in users (commands below).
- Take snapshots of affected cloud VMs and export logs before they rotate.
Bring in the right people
- Brief management with facts only: what is known, what is not, next update time.
- Call your cyber insurer early. Many policies require prompt notice and a pre-approved response firm.
- Involve legal counsel to assess notification duties (for example GDPR’s 72-hour rule, or the SEC’s four-business-day rule for material incidents at US public companies).
- Report to law enforcement: in the US, the FBI at ic3.gov and CISA at cisa.gov/report; in the UK, the NCSC at report.ncsc.gov.uk; elsewhere, your national CERT.
- French-speaking countries: in France, any victim (individual, business or local authority) can get help 24/7 at 17cyber.gouv.fr, organisations can reach the national CERT-FR on 3218 (+33 9 70 83 32 18) or cert-fr@ssi.gouv.fr, and personal data breaches must be notified to the CNIL at notifications.cnil.fr; in Belgium, the Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium at notif.safeonweb.be; in Switzerland, the Federal Office for Cybersecurity (BACS) at bacs.admin.ch; in Canada, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security at cyber.gc.ca.
Plan recovery, not just cleanup
- Verify your backups are intact and were not reachable by the attacker (offline or immutable copies).
- Decide restore order by business priority: identity, email, core apps, then the rest.
- Agree internal and customer messaging. One spokesperson, no speculation.
- Set the next checkpoint time and keep the log going.
Collect evidence: copy-paste commands
Run from an admin prompt and save output to external media or a network share you control. Record the time you ran each one.
Windows (PowerShell, as admin)
# Network connections with owning process netstat -ano > E:\IR\netstat.txt # Running processes with users tasklist /v > E:\IR\tasklist.txt # Logged-on sessions query user > E:\IR\users.txt # DNS cache (recent lookups) ipconfig /displaydns > E:\IR\dns.txt # Export event logs before they roll over wevtutil epl Security E:\IR\Security.evtx wevtutil epl System E:\IR\System.evtx # Scheduled tasks (common persistence) schtasks /query /fo LIST /v > E:\IR\tasks.txt
Linux (as root)
# Network connections with processes ss -tunap > /mnt/ir/ss.txt # Process tree ps auxf > /mnt/ir/ps.txt # Recent and failed logins last -F > /mnt/ir/last.txt lastb -F > /mnt/ir/lastb.txt # Logs from the last 6 hours journalctl --since "6 hours ago" > /mnt/ir/journal.txt # Cron and systemd persistence crontab -l; ls -la /etc/cron.* systemctl list-timers --all # Hash any suspicious file sha256sum /path/to/suspicious_file
Microsoft 365 / Entra ID (compromised user)
# Microsoft Graph PowerShell: sign the user out everywhere Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "User.ReadWrite.All" Revoke-MgUserSignInSession -UserId user@yourcompany.com # Then: reset password, re-register MFA, and check for # new inbox forwarding rules, app consents and OAuth grants
Hash files with our File Hash Checker and defang indicators before sharing them with the Decoder Toolbox.
Never do this
- Run antivirus “clean” or wipe machines before evidence is collected.
- Log in to a suspected machine with a domain admin account (it can expose those credentials).
- Email the team about the incident from a mailbox that may be compromised.
- Restore from backup before you know how the attacker got in.
- Post about it publicly before legal and management agree on the message.
Your contact sheet (fill in and print)
| Role | Name | Phone (out-of-band) |
|---|---|---|
| Incident lead | ________________ | ________________ |
| IT / security on call | ________________ | ________________ |
| Management decision maker | ________________ | ________________ |
| Legal counsel | ________________ | ________________ |
| Cyber insurer (policy no.) | ________________ | ________________ |
| Incident response firm | ________________ | ________________ |
| Hosting / cloud provider support | ________________ | ________________ |
Keep a printed copy offline. During ransomware your contact list on the file server may be encrypted too.
Keep going
This checklist is general guidance based on common incident response practice (for example NIST SP 800-61). It is not legal advice. Adapt it to your organisation, your contracts and the laws that apply to you, and involve qualified professionals for serious incidents.
