MAG212 CYBER ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Trigram Campaign: Fake Recruiters, a Pasted Command and an Infostealer Aimed at AI and Blockchain Developers

November 18, 2026 · El Mostafa Ouchen

Fake jobs, a pasted command, an infostealer: Trigram Campaign: Fake Recruiters, a Pasted Command and an Infostealer Aimed at AI and Blockchain Developers. MAG212 CYBER.

From the MAG212 CYBER Daily, 18 November 2026. Every command is copied from official documentation or the cited analysis and was not tested by MAG212; run it only on systems you are authorised to administer.

Status: Researcher report. Stormshield’s Cyber Threat Intelligence team published its analysis on 11 November 2026 and updated it on 16 November; The Hacker News and others covered it on 17 November. Attribution is Stormshield’s assessment, not a confirmed identity. [1][2]

What happened

Stormshield describes Trigram as a large-scale, industrialised campaign targeting the AI, blockchain and logistics sectors in Europe and the United States. Operators impersonate about 50 brands and run a dedicated back-office platform. The goal is to get developers to execute an infostealer themselves. [1]

The three lures

LureWhat the victim sees
RecruitmentWeb3, AI or tech job pages stressing high pay and fully remote work, with an application form and a referral-code gate
ConferenceAn invitation to a fake “ICAGLLMBT” conference that victims are encouraged to forward to colleagues
Parcel trackingDecoy pages imitating DHL, DPD and Aramex

Source: Stormshield. [1]

Who is affected

Developers and staff in AI, blockchain, technology, finance, education and logistics organisations, according to Stormshield and The Hacker News. Windows, macOS and Linux are all targeted. [1][2]

Why this matters

Developers hold the keys to source code, cloud accounts and crypto wallets, and recruitment lures exploit the moment they are most willing to follow unusual instructions. The paste-a-command trick bypasses email filters and download warnings because the victim runs the attacker's code themselves. (MAG212 analysis)

Fake jobs, a pasted command, an infostealer. Diagram by MAG212 CYBER.
Diagram: MAG212 CYBER. Solid red = observed or confirmed; dashed amber = reported or unverified; green = recommended control.

How the attack works

  1. Lure and gate: the victim fills in a fake application form and passes a referral-code gate. [1]
  2. Fake verification: a ClickFix-style step asks the victim to paste a command into a terminal. The page then shows a fake error, “Operation timeout. Please try again. Nonce Refreshed.”, and replaces the clipboard with a second command. A trailing newline makes it run as soon as it is pasted. [1]
  3. Stage two: the command fetches verify_w on Windows or verify_m on Linux and macOS from the decoy domain. Stormshield notes both commands skip TLS certificate verification. [1]
  4. Runtime: the script installs a portable Node.js (version 20.18.1 if no version 18 or later is present) and downloads install_guard.js, a JavaScript payload with a “deepfake guard” cover story. On Windows the chain uses VBScript and PowerShell and tries to strip the Mark-of-the-Web; on macOS and Linux a fake system password prompt appears, per SafeDep’s findings cited by Stormshield. [1]
  5. Theft: the final stage is an infostealer, which SafeDep calls OverLord, targeting browser credentials, crypto wallets and files, followed by persistence. [1]

A separate path uses trojanized repositories: Stormshield found a project whose .vscode/tasks.json runs scripts from a vendor/ folder when the folder is opened in VS Code. [1]

Infrastructure and attribution

  • GitHub for scraping targets and hosting trojanized repositories. [1]
  • GitLab as a “dead drop” relay that publishes the current command-and-control address; repository paths follow a *-indexings/tasks pattern that persisted across relay generations. [1]
  • Brevo, Resend, Mailgun and Smartlead for bulk email; FullStory for recording victim sessions; mostly Namecheap domains on low-cost top-level domains. [1]

Stormshield links Trigram with high confidence to the UNK_DeadDrop cluster, which Proofpoint assesses as part of the North Korean ecosystem, and reports strong similarities with Kimsuky based on indicators published by Genians. Identity links rest on reused email addresses and accounts and are given confidence levels rather than presented as confirmed. [1][2]

What defenders should look for

  • A terminal, PowerShell or wscript process started shortly after a browser, followed by a new node binary in a user-writable folder.
  • curl or PowerShell downloads with certificate checks disabled from newly registered domains.
  • Outbound requests to GitLab repository paths matching *-indexings/tasks. [1]
  • Repositories whose .vscode/tasks.json runs commands on folder open.
  • Stormshield’s appendix lists about 200 indicators (lure domains, C2 and backup C2 domains, IPs, URLs and two file hashes) and a YARA rule, Dropper_DeepfakeGuard_NodeLoader_Generic. [1]

How to contain and remediate

  1. Isolate a machine where a pasted command ran; do not wait to see what happens.
  2. Assume credentials are stolen: reset browser-stored passwords, revoke session tokens, rotate SSH keys, cloud keys and API tokens used on that machine, and move any crypto assets from wallets present on it to new wallets created on a clean device.
  3. Hunt for persistence and remove the portable Node.js runtime, install_guard.js and any startup entries it created; re-image if in doubt.
  4. Block indicators from Stormshield’s appendix at DNS and proxy.

How to verify recovery

  • The machine is re-imaged or verified clean, with no unexpected Node.js runtime or persistence entries.
  • Old credentials and tokens fail; new ones are issued only to the clean machine.

Prevention and awareness

  • For employees: no genuine recruiter, conference or courier asks you to paste a command into a terminal. If a page does, close it and report it.
  • For developers: run take-home tests and unfamiliar repositories in a disposable VM; keep wallets and production keys off that machine; read VS Code’s workspace trust prompt before trusting a folder.
  • For security teams: consider restricting the Run dialog and terminal launch for non-technical staff, and alert on scripting hosts launched from browsers.

Related on MAG212 CYBER

Sources

  1. [1] Stormshield, “Trigram campaign: AI, blockchain and logistics (CTI report)“, 11 Nov, upd. 16 Nov 2026.
  2. [2] The Hacker News, “Trigram campaign impersonates about 50 AI and blockchain brands“, 17 Nov 2026.

Written and edited by El Mostafa Ouchen for MAG212 CYBER. Facts checked against the sources above as of 18 November 2026, 6:00 AM PT.